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Abstract
Any global temperature target must be translated into an intertemporal carbon budget
and its associated cost-efficient carbon price schedule. Under the Hotelling’s rule, the
growth rate of this price should be equal to the interest rate. It is therefore a puzzle that
cost-efficiency IAM models yield carbon prices that increase at an average real growth rate
around 7% per year. This carbon pricing puzzle suggests that their abatement trajectories
are not intertemporally optimized, probably because of the political unacceptability of a
high initial carbon price. Using an intertemporal asset pricing approach, I examine the
impact of the uncertainties surrounding economic growth and abatement technologies
on the dynamics of efficient carbon prices, interest rates and risk premia. I show that
marginal abatement costs and aggregate consumption are positively correlated along the
optimal abatement path, implying a positive carbon risk premium and an efficient growth
rate of expected carbon prices larger than the interest rate. From this numerical exercise, I
recommend a growth rate of expected carbon price around 3.75% per year (plus inflation).
I also show that the rigid carbon budget approach to cost-efficiency carbon pricing implies
a large uncertainty surrounding the future carbon prices that support this constraint.
In this model, green investors are compensated for this risk by a large risk premium
embedded in the growth rate of expected carbon prices, not by a collar on carbon prices
as often recommended.
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1 Introduction
How urgent is the necessity to decarbonize our economies? Can we wait another decade
to get the anticipated low-cost low-carbon technologies before asking people to finance the
energy transition? Should we again postpone the drastic increase in carbon price necessary
to trigger this transition? In this paper, I address these key policy questions by recognizing
that politicians have already fixed the climate objective of 2◦C without knowing the cost
of the green technologies that one will have to use in the next few decades to attain this
ambitious objective. This ambition has been confirmed at the occasion of the COP-21 in
Paris in 2015. As is well-known, it is associated to an intertemporal carbon budget constraint.
Determining the optimal timing to consume this carbon budget is a problem isomorphic to the
Hotelling’s problem (Hotelling (1931)) of extracting a non-renewable resource (Chakravorty
et al. (2006), Chakravorty et al. (2008), Schubert (2008)). Under this cost-efficiency approach,
abating one ton of CO2 today is a perfect substitute to abating one ton of CO2 in the
future.1 Frontloading the abatement effort is an investment that has a single cost and a
single benefit that are respectively equal to the present and future marginal abatement costs
(MAC), i.e., to the present and future carbon prices. Along the optimal abatement path, this
marginal investment should have a zero net present value. This is possible only if the growth
rate of (expected) carbon price is equal to the (risk-adjusted) discount rate. This extended
Hotelling’s rule applied to climate change is simple and transparent.2 The ambition of the
climate target or the anticipation of future low-cost abatement technologies should influence
the initial carbon price, but not its growth rate over time. In short, under an exogenous
climate objective, the Hotelling’s rule dictates the efficient timing of our climate efforts.
In most climate models, there is no uncertainty and green technological progresses are
known in advance. In that case, the growth rate of carbon prices should therefore be equal to
the interest rate.3 It is then a puzzle that most of these models generate carbon prices whose
real growth rate is much larger than the interest rate. Figure 1 illustrates this observation.
It describes the distribution of annualized real growth rates of world carbon prices from
the database (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB) of models used in the 5th report of the
IPCC. If one limits the analysis to the 767 calibrations of these models that estimate a
world carbon prices for years 2020 and 2050, they yield an average annual growth rate of
7.04% for real carbon prices between these two dates, which is much larger than market
interest rates. This suggests that the allocation of mitigation efforts is not intertemporally
efficient. I refer to this observation as the "carbon pricing puzzle" of cost-efficient IAM
models. It tells us that, compared to the recommendations extracted from these IPCC
1In this introduction, I ignore the natural decay of GHG in the atmosphere.
2It is specific to the cost-efficient approach and does not need to hold in the cost-benefit approach used
for example by Nordhaus (2018). For example, using a 3% discount rate, the U.S. administration published
a scientific report (IAWG (2016)) based on a cost-benefit approach that recommends a price of 42 dollars
(of 2007) per ton of CO2 in 2020, growing to 69 dollars (of 2007) in 2050. This yields a real growth rate of
1.65% per year. Because the carbon concentration in the atmosphere will continue to grow over time under
the optimal mitigation strategy, carbon prices will grow in parallel, assuming a convex damage function.
3In the absence of any credibility problem, the decentralization of the allocation of the intertemporal carbon
budget should be performed by allocating the corresponding permits in the economy, allowing for banking.
Under certainty, these permits are risk-free, which implies that their value – the carbon price – should grow
at the risk-free rate. Attempting to impose a larger growth rate will generate a disequilibrium (excess saving
of permits).
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Figure 1: Histogram of the real growth rate (in % per year) of carbon prices between
2020 and 2050 from 767 calibrations of IAM models contained in the IPCC database
(https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB). The mean annual growth rate of 7.04%, with a median
of 5.70% and a standard deviation of 4.48%.
models, reallocating some climate efforts to the present would be socially desirable. In reality,
these models explore second-best climate policies in which the intertemporal allocation of
the carbon budget is not optimized, certainly because of the political unacceptability of
a high carbon price. Rather, these models characterize carbon price schedules that are
compatible with exogenously determined carbon emission targets at different dates. These
"Representative Concentration Pathways" (RCP) are predetermined by the IPCC. The large
growth rate of carbon prices suggests that the waiting game of international climate politics
has infected the IPCC.4
In the United States, the Climate Leadership Council (CLC) has sponsored an "Economists’
Statement on Carbon Dividends" in early 2019. The CLC supports a carbon price at 40
USD2017 growing at 5% per year above inflation. In France, a recent public report (Quinet
(2019)) has recommended a carbon price growing from 69 EUR2019 to 775 EUR2019 between
2020 and 2050, yielding a real growth rate of 8% per annum. In the United Kingdom, the
official public carbon values grow from 14 GBP2018 in 2020 to 81 GBP2018 in 2030 (BEIS
(2019)), implying a growth rate of 16% per annum. The carbon pricing puzzle described in
this paper exceeds by far the scientific circle around the IPCC and the community of IAM
modelers.
However, this initial puzzle is based on the premise that the evolution of abatement costs
and carbon prices is certain. In this paper, I recognize that this key assumption is utterly
unrealistic, and I explore the impact of uncertainty on the socially efficient growth rate of real
4It is a fair question to ask whether the IPCC should base its recommendations on the first-best allocation,
or whether it should include the political acceptability constraint straight from the beginning into its analysis.
My view on this is that second-best analyses are useful as long as they are clearly announced as such.
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carbon prices. In particular, I explore the possibility that the puzzle be solved by introducing
risk into the model. From a positive viewpoint, I predict the growth rate of expected carbon
prices if the intertemporal carbon budget is decentralized through a market for permits with
full banking.
The abatement models using a cost-efficiency approach and a carbon budget rely on strong
assumptions about the evolution of the abatement cost function during the next few decades
(Pindyck (2013)). Obviously, technologically optimistic models allow for low prices and efforts
in the short run by anticipation of the emergence of these low-cost mitigation technologies.
But in reality, technological changes are hard to predict. If they do not materialize, one
will have to drastically increase carbon prices to satisfy the intertemporal carbon budget.
Nobody really knows today what will be the mitigation cost associated to wind or solar energy
in the future. Deep uncertainties also surround future electricity storage technologies and
nuclear fusion for example. The extraordinary large uncertainty surrounding the emergence
of economically viable renewable systems of energy is an inherent dimension of the energy
transition. Similarly, IAMmodels are generally based on a deterministic growth of total factor
productivity. Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding the growth of TFP in the long run
should also be taken into account to determine the carbon price schedule. If economic growth
is larger than expected, more abatement efforts will have to be implemented to compensate
for the larger emissions and this will require a larger carbon price. As in the "quantity"
approach proposed by Weitzman (1974) under uncertainty, I assume that the carbon budget
is not sensitive to changes in the marginal abatement costs.
Uncertainty should affect the optimal timing of climate efforts and the carbon pricing sys-
tem that support it.5 The expected growth rate of carbon prices – which is also the expected
return of abatement frontloading – should equal the discount rate adjusted for the riskiness
of postponing or frontloading the abatement effort. The Consumption-based Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CCAPM, Breeden (1979), Lucas (1978) and Rubinstein (1976)) tells us how
to perform this adjustment. Suppose for example that, along the optimal path, marginal
abatement costs are negatively correlated with aggregate consumption. Because the MAC
is the future benefit of abatement frontloading, fighting climate change early has the extra
benefit to hedge the macro risk in that context. Because of this negative CCAPM beta of
early mitigation efforts, one should discount the future benefit of this early investment, i.e.,
the future MAC, at a rate lower than the risk-free rate to determine the current price of
carbon. This means at the same time a larger current price of carbon, and a growth rate of
the expected carbon price smaller than the risk-free rate. From a positive point of view, this
carbon pricing system is compatible with an equilibrium, as investors in green technologies
will have an expected rate of return smaller than the interest rate, just because such green
investments hedge their global portfolio risk. On the contrary, if MAC and aggregate con-
5The theoretical question raised here is about how to adapt the Hotelling’s rule to uncertainty. There has
been a few attempts to answer this question in the late XXth century. For example, Pindyck (1978, 1980)
explores the optimal extraction strategy of risk-neutral owners of a nonrenewable resource when exploration
is possible or when the stock of this resource and the demand for it are unknown. This analysis is useful to
examine a resource-rich country that is unable or unwilling to make this asset financially liquid, but it is not
directly relevant in the context of the carbon budget problem. Indeed, households, investors and firms that
will bear the mitigation risk will also bear all other statistically-linked risks in the economy. Our approach is
closer to Gaudet and Howitt (1989), Gaudet and Khadr (1991) and Slade and Thille (1997) who examined
the case of stochastic processes for economic growth and extraction costs in the context of a non-renewable
resource.
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sumption correlate positively, i.e., if the climate beta is positive, the risk premium will be
positive, the current price of carbon will be smaller, and the growth rate of expected carbon
price will be larger than the interest rate. This policy provides the right price signal for
private investors in renewables technologies to take account of the impact of their decisions
on social welfare, as is the case on efficient financial markets for other investment projects.
It remains to characterize the determinants of this carbon beta.6 To do this, I develop
a two-period "act-then-learn" model in which the dynamically optimal mitigation strategy
is endogenously determined under uncertainty about the future abatement cost function,
economic growth and carbon budget. I characterize the impact of these sources of uncertainty
on the optimal growth rate of expected carbon price, and I realistically calibrate this model.
Most integrated assessment models which allow for uncertainty do that by using a "learn-
then-act" methodology. Under that approach, it is assumed that the modeler observes the
realization of the vector of uncertain parameters before optimizing the climate policy under
certainty. The mean value of the conditionally optimal policies across all possible realizations
of this vector is then recommended as the optimal policy under uncertainty. This method
is not satisfactory because it ignores the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty, and
therefore the role of precaution that is inherent to our world. It also produces carbon prices
that are not coherent with the system of assets prices in the economy. By using stochastic
dynamic optimization and backward induction, I more realistically determine the optimal
climate policy in the first period before the resolution of the uncertainty taking place in
the second period. I solve the classical asset pricing puzzles (Mehra and Prescott (1985),
Weil (1989) and Kocherlakota (1996)) of the CCAPM by introducing catastrophes in the
growth process, as suggested by Barro (2006).7 In this framework, I show that the beta
of abatement frontloading is the income-elasticity of MACs. Multiplying this beta by the
equilibrium aggregate risk premium tells us by how much the growth rate of expected carbon
price should differ from the equilibrium interest rate. I show that the sign of this carbon
beta is generally ambiguous, with different sources of uncertainty pushing the climate beta
in opposite directions. However, a realistic calibration of the two-period model suggests a
positive climate beta. This means that it is socially desirable to implement a climate strategy
with a growth rate of expected carbon price that is larger than the interest rate, thereby
allowing to start with a relatively low carbon price today. Thus, this analysis justifies using a
discount rate for green technologies and planning for a growth rate of expected carbon prices
that are larger than the interest rate. It could thus help solving the carbon pricing puzzle.
However, the efficient growth rate of carbon prices is around 3.5%, which is much smaller
than the 7.04% observed on average in the database of models of the IPCC. The bottom line
of my analysis remains that the RCPs of the IPCC inefficiently allocate abatement efforts
over time. The same final concentration of GHG in the atmosphere could be obtained with
a smaller impact on intergenerational welfare by abating more today, and abating less in the
future.
A possible explanation of the carbon pricing puzzle is based on the existence of political
constraints related to the social acceptability of climate policies around the world in the short
6Dietz et al. (2018) examined the risk profile of carbon prices using the cost-benefit analysis of the DICE
model. In this alternative approach, the key determinant of the climate beta is the income-elasticity of climate
damages.
7I also examine a model in which the asset pricing puzzles are resolved by using the long run risk approach
of Bansal and Yaron (2004). I show that my key results are not affected by this critical change in modeling.
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run. Following Gollier and Tirole (2015) for example, these constraints are typically at play
to postpone climate efforts to the future, a phenomenon of procrastination that could explain
why the above-mentioned models support a low current carbon price and a large growth rate
of this price. This raises the question of the credibility of long-term climate commitments.
Laffont and Tirole (1996) take this question seriously by proposing a commitment device
based on forward financial contracts. Harstad (2019) justifies strategic investments and in-
vestment subsidies in technologies that are strategic complements to future green investments
when the social planner faces a time-consistency problem from hyperbolic discounting.
In the next section, I assume that the optimal abatement strategy under the carbon
budget is known, and I characterize the properties of the carbon pricing system that supports
this social optimum, assuming an exogenous statistical relation between MAC and aggregate
consumption. Section 3 is devoted to a simple two-period model in which the price of carbon
in the first period must be determined under uncertainty about economic growth, green
innovation and carbon budget. The carbon beta is determined endogenously in this section.
In Section 4, I calibrate this model.
2 CCAPM carbon pricing
In this section, I characterize the socially optimal expected growth rate of the carbon price
based on the classical consumption-based CAPM model. In the spirit of this model, the
optimality condition is translated into an asset pricing rule. This rule can be used as an
optimality test for the underlying dynamic allocation. However, it provides only a partial
characterization of the optimal allocation. Its full characterization is provided in the next
section in a simplified framework.
Suppose that the economy has a representative agent whose rate of pure preference for
the present is ρ. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u of the representative
agent is increasing and concave. Along the optimal path, the consumption per capita Cτ |τ≥0
evolves in a stochastic way. In the constellation of investment opportunities existing in the
economy, consider a marginal incremental project that yields a cost I0 today and generates a
single benefit Bt at date t, where Bt is potentially uncertain and statistically related to the
stochastic process governing aggregate consumption. At the margin, investing in this project
raises the discounted expected utility of the representative agent by
∆V = −I0u′(C0) + e−ρtE[Btu′(Ct)]. (1)
The size of the investment in this project is optimal if and only if ∆V = 0. If one reinterprets
I0 as the current price of an asset yielding the single benefit Bt at date t, this optimality
condition is also an equilibrium condition and an asset pricing rule. The CCAPM makes use
of this observation to price any asset in the economy. For example, the risk-free claim Bt = 1
should be priced today as Pft = e−ρtE[u′(Ct)]/u′(C0). This equilibrium condition gives us the
interest rate rft in the economy once price Pft is translated into a return rft = −t−1 log(Pft).
Let A′τ |τ≥0 denote the dynamics of marginal abatement costs along the optimal allocation
of mitigation efforts. It can also be interpreted as the dynamics of equilibrium carbon prices.
If the climate policy is decentralized through a market for bankable emission permits for
example, marginal abatement costs will be equalized across firms and individuals, and will
be equal to the equilibrium carbon price. Let δ denote the rate of natural decay of CO2
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in the atmosphere. Along the optimal mitigation path, contemplate a marginal reallocation
of climate efforts consisting in reducing CO2 emissions by 1 more ton today. This allows
for a marginal increase in emissions by exp(−δt) tons at date t, leaving the total carbon
budget unaffected. This investment yields an initial cost A′0 and generates a future benefit
Bt = exp(−δt)A′t. Applying the optimality condition ∆V = 0 to this strategy, we must have
that
A′0 = exp(−(δ + ρ)t)
E[A′tu′(Ct)]
u′(C0)
. (2)
Suppose that A′t and Ct are comonotone.8 Because of risk aversion, equation (2) implies that
(see for example Gollier (2001), Proposition 15):
A′0
E[A′t]
< exp(−(δ + ρ)t)E[u
′(Ct)]
u′(C0)
= exp(−(rft + δ)t). (3)
Let gt = t−1 log(E[A′t]/A′0) denote the growth rate of expected carbon price.9 The above
inequality directly implies that this growth rate is larger than rft + δ. The opposite is true
when A′t and Ct are anti-comonotone. In the special case where A′t is certain, the growth rate
of carbon price should be equal to the sum of the interest rate and the rate of natural decay.
This is the well-known Hotelling’s rule adapted to carbon pricing under a fixed intertemporal
carbon budget (Schubert (2008)). This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The growth rate of the expected carbon price that supports the optimal tem-
poral allocation of abatement efforts is larger (smaller) than the sum of the interest rate and
the rate of decay of carbon dioxide if the marginal abatement cost and aggregate consumption
are (anti-)comonotone.
From the social point of view, facing a positive correlation between marginal abatement
costs and aggregate consumption is good news. It means that the worst-case scenarios in
terms of abatement costs arise when aggregate consumption is large, i.e., when the marginal
abatement effort has a smaller utility impact. Abating more in the future reduces the macroe-
conomic risk. This hedging benefit raises the collective willingness to postpone abatement
efforts. It reduces the efficient carbon price today, in exchange for a larger growth rate of
the expected price. From the individual point of view, investors who abate early in exchange
for saving their permits must be compensated for the fact that the benefit of doing so has a
positive beta, in the sense that the return of this investment is smaller when other assets also
perform poorly in the economy. Because the return of abatement frontloading is the growth
rate of carbon price, this compensation takes the form of a growth rate of expected carbon
price larger than the sum of the interest rate and the rate of natural decay.
I illustrate Proposition 1 in two special cases. The benchmark case corresponds to the
standard CCAPM. Suppose that relative risk aversion is a constant γ. Suppose also that ag-
gregate consumption and marginal abatement costs evolve according to the following stochas-
8Two random variables (X,Y ) are said to be comonotone iff for any pair (s, s′) of states of nature, (X(s)−
X(s′))(Y (s)− Y (s′)) is non-negative. Anti-comonotonicity is defined symmetrically.
9In general, variables gt and rft are maturity-dependent. Our findings should be understood as being
applicable to any maturity.
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tic process:
dct = µcdt+ σcdzt (4)
da′t = µpdt+ φσcdzt + σwdwt, (5)
with ct = logCt and a′t = logA′t, and where zt and wt are two independent standard Wiener
processes. This means that the logarithm of aggregate consumption and marginal costs
are jointly normally distributed. Parameters µc and σc are respectively the trend and the
volatility of consumption growth. The trend of growth of the marginal abatement cost, and
thus of the carbon price, is given by parameter µp. The volatility of the marginal abatement
cost has an independent component σw and a component coming from its correlation with
economic growth. Notice that φ can be interpreted as the elasticity of marginal abatement
costs to unanticipated changes in aggregate consumption.
I provide a formal proof of the following proposition in the Appendix, together with the
characterization of the risk-free rate and the aggregate risk premium. It is an application
of the CCAPM, and to its illustration to the pricing a non-renewable resource (Gaudet and
Khadr (1991)).
Proposition 2. Suppose that relative risk aversion is constant and that the logarithms of
aggregate consumption and marginal abatement costs follow a bivariate Brownian process.
Then, the growth rate of the expected carbon price that supports the optimal temporal alloca-
tion of abatement efforts must be equal to the sum of three terms:
• δ: the rate of natural decay of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere;
• rf : the interest rate in the economy;
• φpi: the abatement risk premium, which is the product of the income-elasticity (φ) of
marginal abatement cost by the aggregate risk premium (pi) in the economy.
In short, we have that
g = δ + rf + φpi, (6)
where the interest rate rf and the aggregate risk premium pi are characterized in the Ap-
pendix. This result tells us that the CCAPM risk premium for carbon permits holds with
a CCAPM "carbon beta" being equal to the income-elasticity φ of the marginal abatement
cost. An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that the growth rate of expected carbon
price is larger (smaller) than the sum of the interest rate and the rate of decay of carbon
dioxide if the income-elasticity of marginal abatement costs is positive (negative). This is a
special case of Proposition 1.
Under the stochastic process (4)-(5), the estimation of the key parameter φ is rather
simple. Indeed, this system implies that
∆ log(A′t) = a+ φ∆ log(Ct) + εt, (7)
where ∆ log(A′t) and ∆ log(Ct) are respectively changes in log marginal cost and in log con-
sumption, and εt is an independent noise that is normally distributed. This means that,
under these assumptions, the OLS estimator of the slope of this linear equation is an unbi-
aised estimator of the income-elasticity of the marginal abatement cost that must be used to
determine the efficient growth rate of expected carbon price.
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This CCAPM example is imperfect for at least two reasons. First, as is well-known, the
CCAPM faces the standard puzzles of asset pricing, in particular the risk-free rate puzzle
and the equity premium puzzle. Second, it is clear that the income-elasticity of the marginal
abatement cost is endogenous and sensitive to the mitigation strategy that will be followed
at equilibrium. This is why the remainder of this paper is devoted to the analysis of an
alternative application of Proposition 1 that solves these two issues.
3 The determinants of the carbon beta under an exogenous
carbon budget
In this section, I explore the determinants of the income-elasticity of the marginal abatement
cost, i.e., the cost-efficient carbon beta. Because the current and future marginal abatement
costs depend upon the intertemporal abatement strategy, its characterization requires solving
the intertemporal carbon allocation problem. This cannot be easily done in a continuous-time
framework. In this section, I solve this problem in a simple two-period framework. Suppose
that the carbon budget constraint covers only two periods, t = 0 and 1. The production
of the consumption good is denoted Y0 and Y1 for periods 0 and 1 respectively, where Y1 is
uncertain in period 0. The carbon intensity of the economy in the business-as-usual scenario
in period t is denoted Qt, so that QtYt tons of carbon dioxide are emitted in period t under
this scenario. The country is committed not to exceed a total emission target T for the two
periods, net of the natural carbon sinks. As stated for example in the Paris Agreement,
the long-term carbon budget allocated to the countries could be modified depending upon
new scientific information about the intensity of the climate change problem for example.
In our model, this means that, in period 0, there may be some uncertainty about what the
intertemporal carbon budget T will be in the future.
Compared to the business-as-usual scenario, the country must choose how much to abate
in each period. Let Kt denote the number of tons of carbon dioxide abated due to actions
implemented in period t,10 so that one can write the carbon budget constraint as follows:
e−δ (Q0Y0 −K0) +Q1Y1 −K1 ≤ T, (8)
where δ is the rate of natural decay of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. I hereafter as-
sume that this ex-post carbon budget constraint is always binding, so that I can rewrite the
abatement in period 1 as a function of the other variables:
K1 = K1(K0, Y1, T ) = e−δ (Q0Y0 −K0) +Q1Y1 − T. (9)
Because Y1 and T are uncertain, so is the abatement effort K1 in period 1 that will be
necessary to satisfy the intertemporal carbon budget constraint.
Abating is costly. Let A0(K0) and A1(K1, θ) denote the abatement cost function in periods
0 and 1 respectively. I assume that At is an increasing and convex function of Kt. In order
to allow for technological uncertainty, A1 is a function of parameter θ, which is unknown in
10This definition allows us to include in the analysis long-term green investments made in period 0 that also
reduce emissions in period 1 at zero marginal cost. Under this interpretation, K1 is the abatement in period
1 net of the abatement generated by investments made in the previous period.
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period 0. Consumption in period t is the production net of the abatement cost in that period,
i.e., Ct = Yt −At.
The problem of the social planner is thus to select the abatement strategy (K0,K1) that
maximizes the intertemporal welfare function subject to the carbon budget constraint:
max
K0,K1
H(K0,K1) = u (Y0 −A0) + e−ρE[u (Y1 −A1)] s.t. (9). (10)
The first-order condition of this problem is written as follows:
A′0u
′ (C0) = e−ρ−δE
[
A′1u
′ (C1)
]
, (11)
where A′t denote the partial derivative of the total abatement cost function with respect to
abatement Kt.
We know from Proposition 1 that the growth rate of the expected carbon price is larger
(smaller) than the interest rate plus the rate of natural decay when the marginal abatement
cost and aggregate consumption are (anti-)comonotone. In the remainder of this section,
I examine various special cases that highlight the factors that determine the nature of the
statistical relation between these two random variables along the optimal path. To do this,
let us fully differentiate A′1 and C1 with respect to the three sources of uncertainty (Y1, θ, T ):
dA′1 = Q1A′′1dY1 −A′′1dT +
∂A′1
∂θ
dθ (12)
dC1 = (1−Q1A′1)dY1 +A′1dT −
∂A1
∂θ
dθ. (13)
Suppose first that the only source of uncertainty in the economy is related to the exogenous
growth of production Y1, so that T and θ are fixed. In that context, the only source of
correlation between A′1 and C1 comes from the fact that both random variables covary with
Y1. From the first term in the right-hand side of equation (12), we see that A′1 is increasing
in Y1, since A′′1 is positive. A positive productivity shock raises the marginal abatement cost.
This is because it raises emissions under the business-as-usual together with the abatement
effort to compensate it. Because the MAC is increasing in the effort, it covaries positively with
Y1. Suppose now that Q1A′1 is smaller than unity. From the first term in the right-hand side
of equation (13), this implies that a positive productivity shock increases consumption in spite
of the fact that it also necessitates an additional abatement effort to compensate the excess
emissions generated by the shock. Thus, under this condition, a positive productivity shock
affects positively the MAC and aggregate consumption. Thus, A′1 and C1 are comonotone in
this context. Using Proposition 1, this demonstrates the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the growth of aggregate production Y1 is the only source of
uncertainty in the economy, and that Q1A′1 is smaller than unity. Then, it is socially desirable
that the growth rate of expected carbon price be larger than the sum of the interest rate and
the rate of decay of CO2.
A similar exercise based on the signs of the second terms in equations (12) and (13) can
be done in a context where the only source of uncertainty is related to the intertemporal
budget constraint T. In that case, a larger budget T implies a smaller abatement effort, and
thus a larger share of production available for consumption rather than for abatement efforts.
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At the same time, because of the convexity of the cost function, the marginal abatement cost
is smaller. Thus, aggregate consumption and marginal abatement cost are anti-comonone.
This yields the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the intertemporal carbon budget T is the only source of uncer-
tainty in the economy. Then, it is socially desirable that the growth rate of expected carbon
price be smaller than the sum of the interest rate and the rate of decay of CO2.
Suppose finally that the only source of uncertainty is about θ, which is related to the
speed of green technological progress. Suppose that an increase in θ implies a reduction in
both the total and the marginal abatement costs, i.e., that for all (K1, θ),
∂A1(K1, θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 and ∂A
′
1(K1, θ)
∂θ
≤ 0. (14)
A possible illustration is when marginal abatement cost is an uncertain constant, i.e., when
A1(K1, θ) is equal to α + g(θ)K1 with g′ ≤ 0, a case examined by Baumstark and Gollier
(2010). In that context, a small θ means at the same time a large marginal abatement cost
and a large total abatement cost, and thus a low aggregate consumption. Thus, A′1 and C1
are anti-comonotone in that context, thereby demonstrating the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the speed of green technological progress θ is uncertain. If total
and marginal abatement costs are comonotone (condition (14)), it is socially desirable that
the growth rate of expected carbon price be smaller than the sum of the interest rate and the
rate of decay of CO2.
Up to this point, I only characterized the impact of uncertainty on the optimal growth
rate of the carbon price. A more complete analysis would be to characterize its effect on the
optimal abatement effort in the first period. This is a more difficult question. In order to
address it, I simplify the problem by assuming that the marginal abatement cost in period 1
is constant but potentially uncertain: A1(K1, θ) = θK1. In that case, aggregate consumption
in period 1 equals
C1 = Y1 − θ
(
e−δ (Q0Y0 −K0) +Q1Y1 − T
)
.
Observe that in that case, the first period abatement K0 has a role similar to saving in
the standard consumption-saving problem. Each ton of CO2 "saved" in the first period
generates an increase in consumption by R = θ exp(−δ) in the second period, where R can be
interpreted as the rate of return on savings. Suppose first that θ is certain. It is well-known in
that case that the uncertainty affecting future incomes raises optimal (precautionary) saving
if and only if the individual is prudent (Drèze and Modigliani (1972), Leland (1968), Kimball
(1990)).11 Applying this result to our context directly yields the following proposition. Notice
that because the marginal abatement cost is certain, it must grow at the interest rate in this
case.
Proposition 6. Suppose that A1(K1, θ) = θK1 and that the marginal abatement cost θ is
a known constant. Increasing risk on future production Y1 or on the intertemporal carbon
budget T increases the initial abatement effort K0 if and only if the representative agent is
prudent.
11An individual is prudent if and only if the third derivative of u is positive.
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When the marginal abatement cost is uncertain, the future return of abating more today
becomes uncertain in that case. By risk aversion, this reinforces the willingness to abate in
the first period because it also reduces the risk borne in the second period. Because of this
second effect, prudence is sufficient but not necessary in this case.
Proposition 7. Suppose that A1(K1, θ) = θK1 and that the marginal abatement cost θ is the
only source of uncertainty. Increasing the risk affecting the marginal abatement cost θ raises
the initial abatement effort K0 if the representative agent is prudent.
Proof: Consider two random variables, θ1 and θ2, where θ2 is riskier than θ1 in the
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Let Gi(K0) = Hi(K0,K1(K0, Y1, T )) denote the
corresponding objective function, as described by (10). Let K0i denote the optimal initial
abatement under distribution θi of the marginal abatement cost. The optimal abatement
effort K01 under the initial uncertainty θ1 satisfies the first-order condition
A′0(K01)u′ (Y0 −A0(K01)) = βE
[
θ1u
′ (Y1 − θ1K11)
]
, (15)
where K11 is the optimal abatement effort in period 1 under the initial risk θ1, i.e., K11 =
K1(K01, Y1, T ). Because G2 is concave in K0, I obtain that K02 is larger than K01 if and only
if G′2(K01) is positive. Using condition (15), this condition can be written as follows:
E
[
θ2u
′ (Y1 − θ2K11)
] ≥ E [θ1u′ (Y1 − θ1K11)] . (16)
This is true for any Rothschild-Stiglitz risk increase if and only if function v is convex, where
v(θ) equals θu′(Y1− θK11) for all θ in the joint support of θ1 and θ2. It is easy to check that
v′′(θ) = −2K11u′′(Y1 − θK11) + θK211u′′′(Y1 − θK11). (17)
Because K11 is positive and u′′ is negative, we see that v is convex when u′′′ is positive. 
4 Calibration
In this section, I calibrate the two-period model described in the previous section. A standard
approach to climate policy in the western world is based on the hypothesis that the energy
transition should be performed within the next 3 decades in order to remain below the 1.5◦C
objective with probability 1/2. I follow for example Metcalf (2018) to decompose the next
3 decades into two periods of 15 years, 2021-2035 and 2036-2050. I examine the case of the
European Union (EU-28). I hereafter describe the calibration of this model. I assume a rate
of pure preference for the present equaling ρ = 0.5% per year, and a constant relative risk
aversion γ = 3.
4.1 Economic growth
The current annual GDP of EU-28 is around 19,000 billions US$ (GUS$). Assuming an
annual growth rate of 1.4% per year over the period 2021-2035 yields a total production for
this first period estimated at Y0=315,000 billions US$. The production Y1 of the second
period is uncertain. A key element of this paper is that the recommended returns of green
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investments are compatible with the equilibrium returns of other assets in the economy, and
with intertemporal social welfare. However, as is well-known, the CCAPM model that I
use in this paper has been unable to predict observed asset prices when beliefs are normally
distributed as assumed in Section 2. This model yields an interest rate that is too large and
an aggregate risk premium that is too low.12 In most of this paper, I use the resolution
of these asset pricing puzzles that has been proposed by Barro (2006), who recognized the
plausibility of infrequent large recessions that are not well represented in U.S. growth data.
I follow the calibration proposed by Martin (2013). The change in log production during the
second subperiod is equal to the sum of 15 independent draws of an annual growth rate xi
whose distribution compounds two normally distributed random variables:
log
(
Y1
Y0
)
=
15∑
i=1
xi (18)
xi ∼ (hbau, 1− p;hcat, p) (19)
hbau ∼ N(µbau, σ2bau) (20)
hcat ∼ N(µcat, σ2cat). (21)
With probability 1 − p, the annual growth rate is drawn from a "business-as-usual" normal
distribution with mean µbau = 2% and volatility σ2bau = 2%. But with a small probability
p = 1.7%, the annual growth rate is drawn from a "catastrophic" normal distribution with a
large negative µcat = −35% and a large volatility σ2cat = 25%. In Table 1, I describe the value
of the parameters of the model that are used as a benchmark. The order of magnitude of the
parameters of the production growth process is in the range of what has been considered by
Barro (2006) and Martin (2013). It yields an annual trend of growth of 1.37% and an annual
volatility of 6.12%.13 It also generates an expected production of Y1 = 387, 000 billions USD
(GUS$) in the second period.
4.2 Emissions, decarbonization and decay
The EU-28 currently emits 4.4 GtCO2e per year. Under the Business-As-Usual (BAU), I
assume that this flow is maintained over each of the 15 years of the first period, implying 66
GtCO2e emitted in this scenario. When compared to the production Y0 estimated above, this
yields a carbon intensity of Q0 = 2.10× 10−4 GtCO2e/GUS$. Even without any mitigation
policy, the world economy has benefitted from a natural reduction of the energy intensity of
its global production over the recent decades. According to Clarke et al. (2014), the average
rate of decline of the energy intensity has been approximately 0.8% per year between 1970
and 2010. This is why I assume in this calibration exercise that the carbon intensity in the
12See for example Kocherlakota (1996) and Cochrane (2017).
13It is interesting to compare the long run risk generated in this model to the one examined by Nordhaus
(2018) and Christensen et al. (2018). They uses a survey of a panel of experts to characterize the uncertainty
in estimates of global output for the period 2010-2050. Experts were requested to estimate the average annual
growth rate of the period. The resulting estimates were best fit using a normal distribution, with a mean
of 2.59% and a standard deviation of 1.13%. This yields a standard deviation of log(Y2050/Y2010) equaling
40 × 1.13% = 45.2%. This should be compared to the standard deviation of √40 × 6.12% = 38.7% for this
variable in my model. Thus, I assume long run output uncertainty whose intensity is similar to the sample in
Nordhaus (2018).
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second period goes down to Q1 = 1.85 × 10−4 GtCO2e/GUS$ in the BAU. This implies an
expected total emission of around 72 GtCO2e in the second period under the BAU.
There exists an intense debate about the half-life of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,
and thus on its rate of natural decay. It appears that the carbon cycle is highly no linear,
and involves complex interactions between the atmosphere and different layers of the oceans.
The existing literature on the half-life of carbon dioxide offers a wide range of estimates, from
a few years to several centuries.14 I conservatively assume a rate of natural decay of CO2 in
the atmosphere of 0.5% per year. This implies a total expected emission net of the natural
decay for the European Union over the period 2021-2050 in the BAU around 133 GtCO2e.
4.3 Carbon budget
In the most recent report of the IPCC (IPCC (2018)), the goal of not exceeding a 1.5◦C
increase in temperature compared to the pre-industrial age is estimated to be compatible with
a median carbon budget of 770 GtCO2 in early 2018. Given that we have emitted around
40 Gt of greenhouse gases per year since then, I assume that this global carbon budget has
now been reduced to 730 Gt. There is a debate about how to share this total carbon budget
among the different countries. Let me take the conservative (and ethically sounded) approach
of sharing the global budget on a per capita basis. Because the European Union is home
for roughly 7% of the world population, I assume that EU-28 should be allocated a carbon
budget of approximately 50 GtCO2e. Let me further assume that four-fifth of this budget
could be consumed between 2021 and 2050. This gives an expected carbon budget for EU-28
for that period equalling µT=40 GtCO2e. Compared to the global emission of 133 GtCO2e,
this represents a global abatement effort of 93 GtCO2e, or a reduction of more than 70% of
the global BAU emissions in the EU-28 during the next 3 decades.
There is of course much uncertainty about what will be the actual carbon budget that will
emerge from the international negotiations in the next 3 decades, and from the resolution of
the uncertainty about the intensity of climate change. I model this uncertainty by assuming
that T is normally distributed with mean µT and standard deviation σT = 10 GtCO2e.
4.4 Abatement costs
I assume that the abatement cost function is quadratic:
At(Kt) = atKt +
1
2bK
2
t . (22)
An important element of the model is related to how the MAC changes with the ambition of
the mitigation policy. The answer to this question is given by the MAC slope coefficient b.
The researchers behind the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA, Morris
et al. (2012)) have developed computable general equilibrium models with a very detailed
energy sector. They have estimated the shadow price of carbon associated to various carbon
budgets for different regions of the world, thereby generating regions-specific MAC curves. I
used their analysis of the MAC curve for the European Union in 2020 to estimate that the
MAC increases by 25 GUS$/GtCO2 whenever the annual abatement effort is increased by
14For a survey on this matter, see Archer et al. (2009).
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parameter value description
ρ 0.5% annual rate of pure preference for the present
γ 3 concavity of utility function
p 1.7% annual probability of a macroeconomic catastrophe
µbau 2% mean growth rate of production in a business-as-usual year
σbau 2% volatility of the growth rate of production in a business-as-usual year
µcat -35% mean growth rate of production in a catastrophic year
σcat 25% volatility of the growth rate of production in a catastrophic year
Y0 315,000 production in the first period (in GUS$)
δ 0.5% annual rate of natural decay of CO2 in the atmosphere
Q0 2.10× 10−4 carbon intensity of production in period 0 (in GtCO2e/GUS$)
Q1 1.85× 10−4 carbon intensity of production in period 0 (in GtCO2e/GUS$)
µT 40 expected carbon budget (in GtCO2e)
σT 10 standard deviation of the carbon budget (in GtCO2e)
b 1.67 slope of the marginal abatement cost functions (in GUS$/GtCO2e2)
a0 23 marginal cost of abatement in the BAU, first period (in GUS$/GtCO2e)
µθ 2.31 expected future log marginal abatement cost in BAU
σθ 1.21 standard deviation of future log marginal abatement cost in BAU
Table 1: Benchmark calibration of the two-period model.
1 GtCO2e. Expressed for a period of 15 years, this suggests b = 1.67 GUS$/GtCO2e2. I
assume that b is certain and constant over time.
Parameter at measures the MAC along the BAU scenario. For the first period, I estimate
it by the price of carbon permits observed in the summer of 2018 on the EU-ETS market,
around 23 GUS$/GtCO2e. The full elimination of the 66 GtCO2e emitted in the first period
would cost around 5,000 GUS$, or 1.6% of GDP in the first period.
The MAC in the BAU during the second period is uncertain. Anticipating green innova-
tions would suggest using a1 smaller than a0, at least in expectation. By how much smaller
remains an open question. In order to estimate the degree of uncertainty that surrounds
abatement costs in the second period of our analysis, I have used a set of AIM models scru-
tinized by the Working Group III for the Fifth Report of the IPCC (Clarke et al. (2014)).
In the associated database,15 I have collected the 374 estimations of carbon prices for 2030
that are in line with the objective of not exceeding 450ppm over the century. These estimates
differ by the IAM model used for the estimation, and by the assumed technological progresses
available at that time horizon. I provide the histogram of these MAC estimates for 2030 in
Figure 2. The distribution of these estimates is heavily skewed to the right, which suggests
using a lognormal distribution for a1 = θ. The standard deviation of the log MAC in this
sample is equal to σθ = 1.21.16 The standard deviation of the future MAC at the BAU is
equal to 38 US$/tCO2e, which is in the range of the MAC uncertainty measured by Kuik
15https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB
16Because these estimates are based on an ambitious abatement target, the mean value of the carbon price
in this sample is not useful for the estimation of the expected MAC in the BAU.
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et al. (2009) for a time horizon of 15 years.17
The trend of reduction in the MAC in my calibration is aligned with the assumption
made by Nordhaus (2018) that the cost of the backstop technology declines at a rate of 0.5%
per year. In the benchmark calibration, I assume that log(θ) is normally distributed with
mean µθ = 2.31 and standard deviation σθ = 1.21. This yields an expected MAC in the BAU
around 21GUS$/GtCO2e. The 8% reduction in the expected MAC under the BAU measures
the green innovations that are expected to emerge in the next 15 years in the absence of new
policies.
4.5 Results
I solved the first-order condition (11) numerically by using the Monte-Carlo method. I draw
350.000 random triplets (Y1, θ, T ) to estimate the expectation of the right-hand side of this
equality, expressed as a function of K0. The optimal solution yields a specific stochastic
consumption and mitigation path from which one can derive the equilibrium interest rate
and the systematic risk premium:
rf = ρ− log
(
E [u′(C1)]
u′(C0)
)
(23)
pi = − log
(
E [C1u′(C1)]
E [C1]E [u′(C1)]
)
. (24)
One can also compute the stochastic path of the carbon prices (p0, p1) that supports this
optimum. In Table 2, I describe the optimal solution of this problem under the calibration
of the parameters described in Table 1. I obtain equilibrium asset prices that are in line with
the real interest rate and the systematic risk premium that have been observed in the United
States during the last century (Kocherlakota (1996)). Notice also that the expected optimal
abatement is much larger in the second period than in the first one. This is partly due to the
anticipation of a larger price of carbon in the second period. In expectation, the annualized
growth rate of the carbon price equals 3.76%. This is much larger than the sum of the natural
rate of decay of CO2 and the interest rate, which is equal to 1.69%. This is due to the fact
that at the optimum, the marginal abatement cost is positively correlated with aggregate
consumption, as shown in Figure 3. In fact, the OLS estimation of the income-elasticity of
the marginal abatement cost is φ ' 1.00.18
As observed by Metcalf (2018), Aldy (2017) and Hafstead et al. (2017), carbon price
predictability is the most important feature of a climate policy for the business community
as it plans long-term investments in line with the energy transition. For example, Metcalf
(2018) proposes to fix the annual growth rate of carbon price at 4% (plus inflation) as long as
the path of emissions is in line with the objective. However, under uncertainty, the efficient
growth rate of carbon price must be uncertain in this model because the resolution of the
uncertainty affecting economic growth, green innovations and the carbon budget needs to
be translated into a variable carbon price in the second period. In other words, it is not
17These authors performed a meta-analysis of MAC estimates in the literature, and observed a standard
deviation of MAC of 27.9 and 52.9 euros per tCO2e respectively for 2025 and 2050.
18Because consumption and marginal abatement costs are not log normal, equation (35) provides only a
crude estimation of the optimal growth rate of the expected carbon price.
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variable value description
K0 31.10 optimal abatement in the first period (in GtCO2e)
E[K1] 66.30 optimal expected abatement in the second period (in GtCO2e)
p0 74.90 optimal carbon price in the first period (in US$/tCO2e)
E[p1] 132.00 optimal expected carbon price in the second period (in US$/tCO2e)
g 3.76 annualized growth rate of expected carbon price (in %)
rf 0.98 annualized interest rate (in %)
pi 2.51 annualized systematic risk premium (in %)
φ 1.00 OLS estimation of the income-elasticity of the marginal abatement cost
Table 2: Description of the optimal solution in the benchmark case.
possible to be serious about the carbon budget constraint and, at the same time, to insure
all economic agents against changes in the carbon price that is necessary to support the
constraint. I represented the distribution of the carbon price p1 and its annualized growth
rate respectively in Figures 4 and 5. The standard deviation of this annualized growth rate
is equal to 2.4% per annum. It reflects the uncertainties associated to the price of carbon
necessary to satisfy the intertemporal carbon budget constraint. This constraint translates
into an uncertain abatement effort in the second period, as described in Figure 6. Investment
decisions in energy transition should take account of these uncertainties. The attractiveness
of green investments should come from their expected return rather than from their reduced
riskiness, something that cannot be guaranteed under a rigid carbon budget.
The high uncertainty affecting the second period carbon price is also the consequence of
the cost-efficiency approach used in this paper. In the alternative cost-benefit approach, the
absence of green innovation would be partially compensated by allowing emissions to grow.19
This is not possible if one takes the carbon budget constraint seriously. It implies that the
carbon price has to grow faster under the cost-efficiency approach in this adverse scenario.
Ex ante, this means that the carbon price uncertainty is larger.
What is the welfare cost of fighting climate change for the next three decades? To address
this question, I measure welfare associated to a policy by the constant consumption level that
generates the same discounted expected utility generated by that policy. Under the optimal
carbon pricing rule, this "constant-equivalent consumption level" is equal to 330,020 GUS$.
This should be compared to the constant-equivalent consumption level of 332,560 GUS$ that
is obtained with the zero ambition strategy, i.e., when K0 and K1 are zero. This means
that fighting climate change has an effect on intertemporal welfare that is equivalent to a
permanent reduction of consumption by 0.763%.20
4.6 The welfare cost of delaying action
We have seen in the introduction that most calibrations of cost-efficiency IAM models in
the literature yield a growth rate of carbon price that is much larger than the interest rate.
19This observation implies that marginal abatement cost and marginal abatement benefits are positively
correlated, as explained by Stavins (2019).
20Of course, this measure does not take account of the benefits of reduced climate damages borne by future
generations.
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p0 E [p1] g K0 E [K1] Welfare loss
23 179.85 13.71 0.00 95.16 1.044
30 173.36 11.69 4.19 91.27 0.970
40 164.08 9.41 10.18 85.71 0.886
50 154.80 7.53 16.17 80.16 0.826
60 145.53 5.91 22.16 74.60 0.785
70 136.25 4.44 28.14 69.05 0.765
75 132.00 3.76 31.10 66.30 0.763
Table 3: Cost of delaying the abatement effort. The initial price p0 is arbitrarily selected
between the BAU level (23 US$/tCO2) and its efficient level (75 US$/tCO2). The welfare loss
measures the reduction (in %) in the constant welfare-equivalent consumption level compared
to the no-abatement strategy. Units are as in Table 2.
Because these models assume no uncertainty, they imply a suboptimal allocation of the
abatement effort over time, with a lack of effort in the short run, and too much effort in the
long run. This may be due to the political command imposed to these calibrations. In this
section, I am interested in measuring the welfare cost of this inefficiency. Our findings are
summarized in Table 3.
If the EU maintains the price of permits at its 2018 level (23 US$/tCO2) for the next
15 years, it will be forced to increase it to almost 180 US$/tCO2 in expectation during the
second period, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 13.7%. This vastly inefficient
intertemporal allocation of efforts yields a welfare loss that is equivalent to a permanent
reduction of consumption by 1.04%. Compared to the efficient policy, this represents an
increase in welfare loss by 28 basis points, from 0.76%. In short, this means that postponing
the effort by 15 years has an effect on welfare which is equivalent to reducing consumption
by a quarter of a percent during the next three decades, a 37% increase in the welfare cost
of fighting climate change compared to the efficient policy.
It is noteworthy that the selection of an initial carbon price of 50 US$/tCO2, halfway
between the BAU and the optimal carbon prices, yields a growth rate of expected carbon
price of 7.5% per year, not far from what IAM models suggest. The welfare loss associated
to this less inefficient policy is only 8% larger than when using the efficient policy.
4.7 Risk sensitivity analysis
Table 4 provides some information about the sensitivity of the optimum to the intensity
of the exogenous risk of the model. The most interesting comparison to the benchmark is
obtained when all sources of risk are switched off. Suppose that all standard deviations are
reduced to zero, together with the probability of catastrophe. To preserve the mean growth
rate of output, I reduced the mean growth rate to µbau to 1.37%. In this risk-free economy,
we know that the efficient growth rate of carbon prices must be equal to the sum of the
interest rate and the rate of natural decay. No risk premium should be included. However,
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variable benchmark norisk
no
cata
no
macro
risk
no
tech
risk
no
budget
risk
K0 31.10 21.80 26.20 25.90 27.90 30.90
E[K1] 66.30 73.10 69.30 69.40 69.30 66.50
p0 74.90 59.40 66.80 66.30 69.60 74.60
E[p1] 132.00 124.00 137.00 137.00 126.00 132.00
g 3.76 4.93 4.77 4.83 3.94 3.80
rf 0.98 4.43 4.22 4.39 1.22 1.23
pi 2.51 – 0.12 0.00 2.29 2.28
φ 1.00 – 0.66 -24.10 1.01 0.96
Table 4: Risk sensitivity analysis. The "no risk" context is obtained by equalizing all standard
deviations to zero, by reducing the probability of catastrophe to zero, and by replacing µbau
by 1.37% to preserve the expected growth rate of production as in the benchmark. The "no
catastrophe" context is obtained by shifting the probability of catastrophe p to zero, and by
reducing the trend of growth to µbau to 1.37%. The "no macro risk" context combines these
changes with the shift of the volatility σbau to zero. In the "no tech risk" context, I switched
σθ to zero compared to the benchmark. In the "no budget risk" case, I reduced σT to zero
compared to the benchmark. Units are as in Table 2.
the absence of uncertainty switches off the precautionary motive to reduce the interest rate,21
which goes up to rf =4.43% in this context. This yields an efficient growth rate of carbon
price of rf + δ =4.93%. The large discount rate implies that very little effort is made in the
first period, with a low initial carbon price. In the benchmark calibration, the reason for why
much of the mitigation effort is postponed comes from the fact that the MAC is positively
correlated with aggregate consumption. In this alternative context with no risk, there is an
even stronger argument for delaying the effort, namely, the absence of any precautionary
motive to invest.
In the fourth column entitled "no catastrophe", I have solved the model by using the
benchmark calibration except for the probability of catastrophe p that has been switched to
zero, combined with a reduction of µbau to 1.37% in order to leave E[Y1] unchanged. This has
the effect to raise the interest rate and to reduce the systematic risk premium to unrealistic
levels. This observation justifies our choice of introducing macroeconomic catastrophes à la
Barro in our calibration. In the next column, I fully eliminate the risk on Y1. The consequence
of eliminating the macro risk is to generate a negative climate beta, as suggested by our
theoretical results. However, because the systematic risk premium is a small 0.002% in the
absence of macro risk (other than the carbon price risk), the growth rate of carbon price is
only marginally smaller than the sum of the interest rate and the rate of decay.
In the last two columns of Table 4, I document the results of simulations in which risks on
technological progress θ and on the carbon budget T are respectively switched off. Because
these effects are relatively small, these results suggest that the main argument for a departure
21This precautionary motive to reduce the discount rate is best illustrated in the so-called "extended Ramsey
rule" (equation (33) of the Appendix). For more details, see for example Gollier (2016).
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variable benchmark
doubling
carbon
budget
more
green
innovation
doubling
cost
curvature
Nordhaus Stern
K0 31.10 14.10 30.98 15.60 15.00 22.10
E[K1] 66.30 42.20 66.37 40.90 41.40 37.50
p0 74.90 46.60 74.75 75.00 48.00 59.80
E[p1] 132.00 91.50 130.62 158.00 90.20 83.60
g 3.76 4.50 3.72 4.95 4.21 2.23
rf 0.98 1.34 1.24 1.24 2.92 1.63
pi 2.51 2.23 2.24 2.29 0.64 0.38
φ 1.00 1.80 1.00 2.23 1.82 1.98
Table 5: Parameter sensitivity analysis. In the "doubling carbon budget" scenario, I increase
the expected carbon budget from µT = 40 to 80 GtCO2e. In the "more green innovation"
scenario, I double the annual rate of reduction of the MAC in the BAU, so that µθ is reduced
from 2.31 to 2.25. I double the curvature coefficient of the abatement cost function to b = 3.34
in the scenario entitled "doubling cost curvature". In "Nordhaus", I increase the rate of pure
preference for the present from ρ = 0.5% to 1.5%, and I reduce relative risk aversion γ from
3 to 1.45. Finally, in "Stern", I reduce ρ to 0.1% and γ to 1. Units are as in Table 2.
of the Hotelling’s rule g = δ + rf comes from the macroeconomic uncertainty, not from
technological risks or from carbon budget risks. These last two columns also tell us that the
risk associated to climate change tends to reduce the equilibrium interest rate and the socially
desirable risk-free discount rate. Indeed, recognizing that the emergence of mature green
technologies and the level of the carbon budget are uncertain implies a lower interest rate,
because of the enhanced precautionary motive to invest. It also implies a larger systematic
risk premium. It can therefore contribute to the resolution of the classical asset pricing
puzzles.
4.8 Parameter sensitivity analysis
I now turn to the sensitivity analysis related to the non-risk parameters of the model. In Table
5, I first double the expected carbon budget from µT = 40 to 80 GtCO2e. This increases the
income-elasticity of the MAC and the efficient growth rate of carbon price. This implies a
reduction of the carbon price in the first period by almost 40%. I also examined the effect
of increasing the trend of reduction of the MAC in the BAU from around 0.5% to 1% per
annum, but that reduces the optimal growth rate of carbon price only by 0.04%. The optimal
climate policy is very sensitive to the curvature coefficient b of the abatement function. In
line with Proposition 3 and the intuition that supports it, doubling the curvature more than
doubles of the income-elasticity of the MAC, which in turn implies an increase in the optimal
growth rate of carbon prices.
The last two columns of Table 5 are related to the Nordhaus-Stern controversy on the
discount rate. The benchmark calibration was made compatible with observed asset prices.
Following Barro (2006), I introduced macro catastrophes and I assumed a constant relative
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risk aversion equaling γ = 3. I also used a rate of pure preference for the present equaling
ρ = 0.5%. These two coefficients are subject to an intense debate in our profession. Nordhaus
(2018) uses a larger ρ = 1.5%, whereas Stern (2007) uses a smaller ρ = 0.1%. Both use
a smaller γ of 1.45 for Nordhaus, and 1 for Stern. As illustrated by Table 5, this lower
curvature of the utility function implies an equilibrium interest rate which is too large, and
a risk premium which is too small. As expected, the Nordhaus’ calibration of our collective
preferences yields a much smaller initial carbon price and a much larger growth rate of carbon
prices compared to the Stern’s calibration.22
4.9 An alternative approach: Epstein-Zin preferences
I used the Barro’s extreme events argument in this calibration in order to solve the asset pric-
ing puzzles that are inherent to the CCAPM model. In this section, I explore the alternative
standard resolution of these puzzles that has been provided by Bansal and Yaron (2004).
This "Long Run Risk" (LRR) model has two key ingredients. First, the representative agent
is assumed to be endowed with Epstein-Zin recursive preferences, with a large degree of risk
aversion, and a low degree of aversion to consumption fluctuations. Second, the growth rate
of production is sensitive to a slow-moving state variable.
To adapt our model to this alternative resolution of the asset pricing puzzles, I perform
two changes in our model. First, the objective function H now takes the following form:
H(K0,K1) = u (Y0 −A0) + e−ρu (ψ) , (25)
where ψ is the certainty equivalent of future consumption:
v(ψ) = Ev(Y1 −A1). (26)
As is standard, I assume that u and v belong to the family of power functions, with u(c) =
c1−γ/(1 − γ) and v(c) = c1−α/(1 − α). Parameter γ can be interpreted as the aversion to
consumption fluctuations, which is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Parameter α is relative risk aversion. The second change concerns the dynamic process
governing the monthly growth rate of consumption xi. Technically, I substitute the Barro’s
extreme events dynamics (19)-(21) by the following LRR dynamics:
xi+1 = µ+ zi + σεi+1 (27)
zi+1 = kzi + σeei+1. (28)
The slow-moving state variable z has an AR(1) dynamics with a persistency parameter k close
to unity. It is assumed that ε and e are statistically independent N(0, 1) random variables. I
calibrate this model using the parameter values used by Bansal and Yaron (2004), who used a
monthly frequency. This means that log(Y1/Y0) equals x1+...+x180. Because market interest
rates have experienced lower values since the publication of this paper, I have reduced the
monthly rate of impatience from the 0.2% calibrated by Bansal and Yaron (2004) to 0.15%.
The parameter values described in Table 6 replace those presented in the upper part of Table
1.
22Under a cost-benefit approach, Nordhaus would also assume a larger carbon budget than Stern. This is
not taken into account in the discussion based on an exogenous carbon budget.
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value description
ρ 0.15% monthly rate of pure preference for the present
γ 10 relative aversion to risk
α 2/3 relative aversion to consumption fluctuations
µ 0.15% unconditional expected monthly growth rate of production
σ 0.78% st. dev. of shocks to the monthly growth rate of production
σe 0.034% st. dev. of shocks to predictable component of the monthly growth rate of production
k 0.979 persistence coefficient of the expected growth rate process
Table 6: Epstein-Zin calibration of the two-period model. All other parameters are as de-
scribed in the bottom part of Table 1.
variable value description
K0 33.44 optimal abatement in the first period (in GtCO2e)
E[K1] 68.79 optimal expected abatement in the second period (in GtCO2e)
p0 78.85 optimal carbon price in the first period (in US$/tCO2e)
E[p1] 135.86 optimal expected carbon price in the second period (in US$/tCO2e)
g 3.63 annualized growth rate of expected carbon price (in %)
rf 0.87 annualized interest rate (in %)
pi 2.63 annualized systematic risk premium (in %)
φ 1.00 OLS estimation of the income-elasticity of the marginal abatement cost
Table 7: Description of the optimal solution of the long run risk model.
Because future consumption is not log-normally distributed, there is no analytical solution
to the problem of maximizing H under the intertemporal carbon constraint (9). In Table 7,
I describe the numerical solution to this problem. The bottom line of this exercise is that the
LRR model generates an optimal carbon pricing schedule which does not differ much from
our benchmark model. The two models share the same key observation that the CCAPM
beta of efficient carbon prices is close to unity. They also share similar levels for the interest
rate, the market risk premium and the growth rate of expected carbon prices. It is reassuring
to conclude that the main messages of our analysis are independent of the strategy used to
solve the classical asset pricing puzzles.
Other researchers have examined assets and carbon pricing in an Epstein-Zin framework.
In Bansal et al. (2016), final consumption is also affected by the slow-moving average tem-
perature (and climate damages), a second LRR factor in their model. Although both papers
share the objective to explore the role of climate change in asset pricing, the channels of
the climate impacts are radically different. In Bansal et al. (2016), asset prices are affected
by climate damages, whereas they are affected by carbon prices and mitigation efforts in
my model. Daniel et al. (2019) also characterize an optimal carbon pricing schedule with
Epstein-Zin preferences. Rather than using a cost-efficiency approach as in this paper, they
characterize the first-best solution with a climate damage function, considering a much longer
time horizon of 300 years decomposed into 7 periods. Climate damages and mitigation costs
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are uncertain, but they assume no uncertainty about productivity growth. Because I have
shown that the absence of productivity growth uncertainty implies a negative carbon beta,
it should not be a surprise that Daniel et al. (2019) obtain an initial carbon price that is
relatively large, with a strongly negative trend of growth.23 In their model contrary to mine,
early green tech adoption provides a hedge against the long-term aggregate risk. I conjecture
that adding some realistic productivity growth uncertainty into their model will increase the
growth rate of carbon prices.
5 Conclusion
The future social and private benefits of most investments in renewable energy are uncertain
by nature. One of their crucial social benefits is the reduction in emissions of CO2, whose
anticipated future pricing should be a key driver to induce market players to invest. Under a
fixed intertemporal carbon budget constraint, the carbon price should send the right signal
about the evolution of both the scarcity of emission permits and the cost of abatement efforts.
For the sake of efficiency, it needs to be sensitive to macroeconomic and technological shocks.
I have shown in this paper that, along the optimal mitigation path, the marginal abatement
cost is positively correlated with aggregate consumption. To be more precise, I have shown
that the MAC has a CCAPM-beta close to 1. Abating early generates a social benefit –
the future MAC saved – whose risk profile that is not different from a claim on aggregate
consumption. It should be priced accordingly, with a discount rate equaling the interest
rate plus the aggregate risk premium. This means that the expected MAC and carbon price
should grow at that rate. This provides the right compensation for early green technology
adopters for the risk they take.
The renewable industry has often lobbied to obtain guarantees about future carbon prices,
with the claim that it is a necessary condition for a rapid energy transition. This request
is not substantiated. Rather than offering guarantees about future prices – a policy which
would limit the quality of future price signals, one should offer them a larger expected rate of
return for their investments in renewable energies, as a compensation for the risk that these
investments yields. Again, this takes the form of planning a larger growth rate of expected
carbon prices. Very risk-averse green investors should look for financial products that could
hedge the carbon price volatility at market price. Of course, these recommendations rely
on a credible institution able to implement a carbon pricing mechanism that is dual to our
collective climate ambition.
23Confirming a negative climate beta, they obtain an initial carbon price that is increasing in the market
risk premium.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Let rt = t−1 log(E[Bt]/I0) denote the expected return of an asset whose current price is
I0 and future benefit at date t is Bt. Using equation (1), the optimality condition can be
written as follows:
e−rtt = e−ρtE[Btu
′(Ct)]
u′(C0)E[Bt]
. (29)
Using equation (29), the risk-adjusted discount rate rct to discount a claim on aggregate
consumption must satisfy the following efficiency condition:
exp(−rctt) = exp(−ρt)E[Ctu
′(Ct)]
u′(C0)E[Ct]
. (30)
The systematic risk premium pit is the extra expected rate of return of a claim on aggregate
consumption over the interest rate that must compensate agents who accept to bear the
macroeconomic risk:
pit = rct − rft. (31)
Under the two assumptions of the proposition, equation (2) implies that
1 = e−(ρ+δ)tE
[
A′tu′(Ct)
A′0u′(C0)
]
= e−(ρ+δ)tE
[
exp(a′t − γct)
]
.
Notice that our assumptions implies that a′t−γct is normally distributed with mean µx−γµc
and variance (1−γφ)2σ2c +σ2w. By Stein’s Lemma, the above condition can then be rewritten
as follows:
1 = exp
((
−ρ− δ + µp − γµc + 0.5(φ− γ)2σ2c + 0.5σ2w
)
t
)
,
or, equivalently,
µp + 0.5φ2σ2c + 0.5σ2w = δ + ρ+ γµc − 0.5γ2σ2c + φγσ2c . (32)
In this economy, the following standard CCAPM formula for the risk-free interest rate can
be derived from equation (??):
rft = rf = γ + γµc − 0.5γ2σ2c . (33)
The systematic risk premium pit is given by equation (31). Using Stein’s Lemma twice to
estimate rct given by equation (30) yields the following result:
pit = pi = γσ2c . (34)
Notice also that, using Stein’s Lemma again, we have that the expected marginal abatement
cost satisfies the following condition:
E
A′t
A′0
= E exp
(
a′t
)
= exp
((
µp + 0.5φ2σ2c + 0.5σ2w
)
t
)
.
This implies that the growth rate g of expected marginal abatement cost is a constant given
by
28
g = dEA
′
t/dt
EA′t
= µp + 0.5φ2σ2c + 0.5σ2w.
Because in a decentralized economy, the marginal abatement cost is equal to the price of
carbon in all states of nature and at all dates, g can also be interpreted as the growth rate
of expected carbon price. Combining these properties implies that one can rewrite condition
(32) as follows:
g = δ + rf + φpi. (35)
This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Figure 2: Histogram of the world marginal abatement costs for 2030 extracted from the IPCC
database (https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB). I have selected the 374 estimates of carbon
prices (in US$2005/tCO2) in 2030 from the IAM models of the database compatible with a
target concentration of 450ppm.
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Figure 3: Monte-Carlo simulation under the benchmark case. For the sake of readability of
the figure, I limited the simulation to 50.000 draws of the triplets (Y1, θ, T ) to estimate the
optimal abatement strategy. The figure illustrates the positive statistical relation between
log consumption growth and the log marginal abatement costs (and thus log carbon price)
in the second period. The red curve depicts the OLS estimation in log-log.
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Figure 4: Empirical probability distribution of the carbon price p1 (in US$/tCO2e) under
the optimal abatement strategy in the benchmark calibration of the two-period model. The
Monte-Carlo simulation uses a sample of 350.000 draws of the triplet (Y1, θ, T ).
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Figure 5: Empirical probability distribution of the annualized growth rate of carbon price
under the optimal abatement strategy in the benchmark calibration of the two-period model.
The growth rate is in percent per year. The mean growth rate is 3.36% and the standard
deviation is equal to 2.5%.
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Figure 6: Empirical probability distribution of the abatement effort K1 (in GtCO2e) under
the optimal abatement strategy in the benchmark calibration of the two-period model.
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